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1. Introduction 
In the recent years, after a period of relatively high trust in the European Union,  Europe 
has once again seen a rapid and widespread rise of Euroscepticism on the domestic level 
of politics, for the second time after the spike in Euroscepticism caused by the 
Maastricht Treaty. The citizens of European countries are growing more dissatisfied 
with the so-called eurocrats, the reasoning behind it being in many cases that the EU has 
substantial decision-making power and the national parliaments, therefore, have less say 
in, for an example, bailout packages. The countries of the European Union have 
responded to the crisis by moving towards more integration inside the EU by signing 
the European Stability Mechanism and the agreement on the reforms of the Banking 
Union amongst other methods to stabilize the economy. Still, since the crisis reached 
the European Union in 2008, the electorate in some of the creditor countries has become 
tired of taking responsibility for other countries’ poor management of funds and 
spending, while they themselves have managed to cut back on government debt and in 
some cases have directly suffered worsening of everyday life standards, for an example, 
street lighting cutbacks during evenings. This was especially important during the 
financial decline when countries were struggling to uphold the standards set at the times 
of economical prosperity 
 On the other hand, citizens in the so-called „Southern periphery“ of Europe, i.e. 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and others, feel that there is no solidarity in the EU, that they 
are blamed and that is why their distrust in the European institutions has grown. The EU 
is seen as a bully who has taken away decision-making power from national 
democracies and is now exerting control of domestic policies by forcing austerity 
measures and cutbacks on pensions and raising taxes at the same time. „In this new 
situation, governments come or go but policies remain basically the same and cannot be 
challenged. Meanwhile, in northern European countries, the EU is increasingly seen to 
have failed to control the policies of the southern rim. The creditors have a sense of 
victimhood that mirrors that of the debtors,“ (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013:1). 
 Another factor that divides Europe is the problem with migration, both inner 
migration and the waves of immigrants coming from Africa, Middle-East and other 
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developing countries that are not in the EU. On the foremost front of this issue are Italy, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, on whos coastline thousands of immigrants land each week. 
From there, the immigrants mostly try to travel to the north. Concerning the inner-
migration in Europe, people from the ex-Soviet republics try to make their way to the 
central and western part of the EU, where the living standards are higher, corruption is 
not felt that strongly in everyday life and in many cases, the climate is warmer. The 
natives in central-European countries in many cases feel as if the migrants are taking 
away their jobs and opportunities and that might be a reason to blame the EU. They feel 
as if it weren’t for the EU and free market, there wouldn’t be so many migrants in their 
specific country. On the other hand- Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal have expressed 
that they feel as if they have been left alone with the problem of the waves of 
immigrants landing on their shores each week and that this is demanding a great deal of 
financial resources from them. Requests have been made for the other European 
countries to accept asylum seekers and other immigrants as a measure of solidarity and 
on the side, other countries should support them with personnel and financial measures 
to deal with this.  
 This thesis argues that the financial crisis of the European Union and in the 
Eurozone has had an effect on domestic elections and that anti-European parties have 
gained momentum and seats in the parliaments of the countries. The author will test the 
hypothesis that the citizens of the European Union have, in their national parliament 
elections, started to vote more in favour of the parties that advocate anti-Europeanism 
publicly. The paper also argues that most of the Eurosceptic parties are on the right side 
of the traditional right-left ideological scale.  
The thesis consists of four parts. The first part reviews existing literature on how 
to categorize parties that oppose, reject and/or would like to change the European Union 
or European Integration and also seeks an answer to what causes Euroscepticism. In the 
first part, a definition for this thesis will be provided to best characterize Eurosceptical 
parties in this thesis. The second part of the thesis will explain the methodology of the 
research and provide background information about the data, its origins and the use of it 
in this research. It will also more in-depth explain the different variables in this 
research, to better understand the results presented in the third part of the thesis for each 
country individually.  
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Finally, the fourth part will summarize the results and point out key issues that were 
found during the conduct of this thesis. It will also provide some topics that will be 
relevant in the future when more data is available. The analysis results will be presented 
separately for each country. 
2. Definition and Determinants of Party-based Euroscepticism 
2.1 Defining Party-based Euroscepticism 
 
Historically, the roots of the term „Eurosceptic“ can be found in Britain. 
Harmsen & Spiering consider the term „Eurosceptic“ to be a succesor to the British 
term „anti-marketeer“, which was coined in order to express the Britain’s opposition to 
the single and integrated market (Harmsen & Spiering 2005:16, 128). Coming from 
humble beginnings, the term „Eurosceptic“ now has a much broader meaning, which 
encompasses any and every opposition to any aspect related to the European Union. 
Defining Euroscepticism any further has been difficult and while there is a multitude of 
different definitions composed by a variety of leading European scholars, there is no 
perfect one as of yet. First and foremost, two different types of Euroscepticism are 
distinguished from one another, public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism. 
This thesis focuses on party-based Euroscepticism.  The most frequently used 
explanation of the term „party-based Euroscepticism“ expresses opposition against the 
integration of Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002:9).  
Taggart and Szczerbiak have further divided Euroscepticism into two categories: 
Hard and Soft. They define „Hard Euroscepticism“ as „principled opposition to the EU 
and European integration [that]can be seen in parties who think that their countries 
should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to 
being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived, 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002:7). Soft Euroscepticism is explained as „opposition 
against specific EU policies, policy outcomes or institutional features and seek to 
reform the EU rather than abolish the entire project,“ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:7). 
The approach presented by Szczerbiak and Taggart, however, has been constructively 
criticized by Kopecky and Mudde, who have pointed out a key weakness that Soft 
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Euroscepticism was defined over inclusively by Szczerbiak and Taggart, which leads to 
false positives, since every disagreement with policies of the European Union can be 
classified as being Eurosceptic and this will lead to categorizing either more or less 
parties as Eurosceptic, than there is in reality (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:300). 
In addition to pinpointing the weakpoints of the theoretical framework presented 
by Taggart & Szczerbiak, Kopecky & Mudde also present an alternative way of 
dividing the Eurosceptics into categories. The scheme of Kopecky and Mudde 
differentiates between „diffuse“ and „specific“ support for European integration, where 
by under diffuse they mean support for general ideas of European integration that are the 
foundation of the EU. Under the term specific support they mean the general practice of 
European integration, alas, the EU as it is and the direction that it is developing. 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002:300). In their work, Kopecky & Mudde further distinguish 
between Europhiles and Europhobes. Europhiles are found to believe in the ideas of 
institutionalized cooperation and surrendering some of their national sovereignty for the 
advantages that the integrated and liberal common market brings. Europhiles include 
federalists, whose idea of European integration is creating a supranational state and 
those to whom European integration is exclusively about economic terms, e.g. creating 
a free trade zone, but not surrendering any national sovereignty. (Kopecky & Mudde 
2002:301). Europhobes on the other hand do not support and often oppose the general 
ideas of European integration. There is no rule of thumb that Europhobes, or 
Eurosceptics for that matter, have to be on a certain side of the linear right-left 
ideological spectrum, Europhobes may be nationalists, socialists, isolationalists. 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002:301).  
Another aspect that Kopecky & Mudde take into consideration is the support for 
European Union, where they distinguish between the EU-optimists and the EU-
pessimists. The EU-optimists support the EU as it is because of the way it has been built 
or because they are optimistic about the direction that they see is developing towards in 
the future (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:303). The EU-pessimists, on the other hand, do 
not support the EU or European integration as it is in the moment or they are pessimistic 
about the direction of future development. The authors do defer, that not all EU-
pessimists object EU membership. (Kopecky and Mudde 2002:302). It does mean, 
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however, that the parties categorized as such would ideally change some things about 
the European integration or the EU for better suitability to their own wishes.  
The framework of Kopecky and Mudde leads to four ideal-type categories 
regarding parties’ views on Europe, the EU and the European integration. The 
categories, from most support to the 3 aspects to the least, are as follows: 
Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatics, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects. This approach again 
has certain downsides. Firstly, in reality, the category Europragmatic is found to look 
good on paper, but in the real world there are very few parties that can be labelled 
Europragmatic and oppose the very idea of European Union but still support it as it is, 
just because there is no better alternative (Beichelt 2004:46). Secondly, this would 
cause unnecessary confusion and overlapping of categories in some parties’ cases 
(Heinisch, Landsberger, Schlipphak 2011:11).  
 
 Other authors have also created different typologies by building on the theory 
first proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart by adding more „boxes to cross the x into“, 
such as the one suggested by Conti and Verzichelli who came up with adding a „no 
interest in European Integration“ status and two variants for those who regard the EU 
and European Integration as a positive thing: „Functional Europeanism“ and „Identity 
Europeanism“ (Conti and Verzichelli 2002:48). Another theory to classify stances on 
the EU and European Integration was proposed by Flood and Usherwood, which is 
broken down to seven categories that are based upon the degree of support shown 
EU/European integration in general or aspects of it (Flood and Usherwood 2007:7). 
This further fragments the whole concept of Euroscepticism, which might be helpful in 
some cases to better understand, why a party takes a certain stance, but not for a 
quantitative research which includes election results because the categories would 
overlap in many cases and this would result in false positives.  
All in all, there are numerous researches on this topic and a variety of different 
opinions on how to better break down Euroscepticism and define it to the fullest. The 
author concludes it is best to empirically find out how the parties themselves advocate 
for or against the European Union and European Integration. This means that instead of 
categorizing the parties as Hard- or Soft- Eurosceptics or in another way, there will be 
values shown for each party, based on content analysis of the parties’ own manifests 
that were presented for elections, which show to what extent the parties are for or 
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against the EU and European Integration. The values that are provided aid in 
understanding if anti-European rhetoric helped the parties achieve better results or not. 
Together with a percentage value on how much of their manifests the parties dedicated 
to European Issues will give a better understanding of the salience of European Issues to 
the parties.  
 
2.2 Determinants party-based Euroscepticism 
 
The phenomenon of Euroscepticism has been carefully studied by a number of scholars 
and they have come to a number of different conclusions of as to what exactly fuels the 
it. Since different researches focus on different aspects, those conclusions vary from one 
another in a great deal, for an example, authors who focus on the economic aspects are 
likely to, and have also, found negative correlation between long-term GDP growth 
expectations and support for Euroscepticism (Nicoli 2015:20). On the other hand, 
Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia concluded that national identity is very strongly 
correlated to the rise of Euroscepticism, suggesting that support for extreme right parties 
means growth in support anti-European ideas and that confidence in national political 
institutions correlate negatively to Euroscepticism, meaning that if the trust for national 
politicial institutions is high, the support for Euroscepticism is low and vice versa. 
(Serricchio, Tsakatika, Quaglia, 2012:11) 
Moreover, Nicoli has found negative correlation between unemployment and 
Euroscepticism, but suggests that this may be caused by the fact that of the countries 
with high unemployment rates in his panel (Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Greece), only 
Greece has a strong set of Eurosceptic parties and that the countries with a strong set of 
Eurosceptic parties, have low unemployment rates. On the other hand Nicoli has found, 
that youth unemployment correlates positively to Euroscepticism and also suggests that 
this may be due that the youth have less savings in comparison to older citizens, which 
might make them react more painfully to a sudden loss of income compared to older 
citizens, but he also notes that there might be other factors in play, such as differences in 
media consumption (Nicoli 2015:21). Interestingly, Nicoli in his research also found 
that long-term mistrust in the EU has the voters lose hope and not go to European 
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Parliament elections, thus correlating positively. Meanwhile, short term mistrust as a 
consequence of a temporary crisis such as the sovereign debt crisis, mobilizes the voters 
in hope of a better tomorrow, therefore correlating negatively. Moreover, Nicoli found 
that in the case of European Parliament elections voters tend to economically protest-
vote, meaning that in case that the economy of a country is suffering, voters punish the 
governing parties and officials for it by voting for parties in the opposition or for the 
fringe-parties (Nicoli, 2015:21). 
Another cause for Euroscepticism that is directly linked to economy is the rise or 
fall of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Italian Institute for International Political 
Studies (ISPI) has found that in the countries, in which the GDP shrank,  Public 
Euroscepticism has taken a rise. More specifically, a 5% decline on average resulted in 
a 6,6% rise in Public Euroscepticism, thus very strongly negatively correlating. They 
also found that four of the five countries that received a bailout, lie in fact above the 
95% confidence interval for their regression model, meaning that there must be other 
influences beside the very strong economic influence to the Euroscepticism of those 
countries. One theory presented by ISPI is that the public felt that the bailouts came 
with too many conditions for the respective countries (Italian Institute for International 
Political Studies).  
Another cause for party-based Euroscepticism (logically if not correctly) is 
rooted in Public Euroscepticism, which is greatly linked with the economic cost-benefit 
aspect. If a country gains more from EU membership than it costs, the citizens are more 
inclined to be positively minded about the EU membership. Therefore the party-rhetoric 
of office-seeking parties will be positively minded as well. This might not be the case 
for goal-seeking parties, however. Szczerbiak & Taggart in their research found that 
goal-seeking parties will first and foremost evaluate if changing the stance on European 
integration and the EU serves the purpose of fulfilling their goals and serve the benefits 
of their supporters and/or targeted supporters and then, if this should be the case, they 
undertake the ideological shift (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003:19). On the other hand, 
Szczerbiak and Taggart evidently found no clear evidence that a partys’ ideology 
determines their position on Europe. Here they also find it relevant, if the party is 
office-seeking or goal-seeking, meaning for an example that right-wing extreme party 
will most likely be Eurosceptic if it is goal-seeking but again this might not be true if 
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the party is office-seeking and is willing to throw a small amount of ideological stance 
„under the bus“ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003:20). 
The second aspect that Szczerbiak and Taggart point out that the EU and 
„European integration“ are very much open to interpretation, or as they put it- 
„Malleable“, and therefore different parties can interpret the ideas of Europe to suit 
their needs, wants and likes according to what the situation (pre- or post-election) needs. 
Hand in hand with this idea goes the amount of prominence the parties give to the 
European issues, which is from their viewpoint determined by a combination of 
electoral-strategic and coalition-tactical factors. Here, the most important matter is how 
much salience the current and potential target supporters give to the European issues 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003:19).  
Thirdly, Taggart and Szczerbiak found in their research that some parties are 
ideologically more predisposed to be Eurosceptic than others, say right-wing extremist 
parties for an example, but they found no conclusive evidence that a partys’ position on 
the left right scale matters in so far that in example on the right side of the linear scale, 
Euroscepticism dominates, as the authors themselves put it, they found strange 
ideological „bedfellows“. They did however find that Euroscepticism is more likely 
found on both far ends of the linear scale, meaning that center parties which try to 
appeal to a wider range of electorate, are less likely to express Euroscepticism, the 
fringe parties on the other hand, which appeal to a more narrow set of electorate are 
likely to delve into Euroscepticism to catch the votes of people dissatisfied with the 
current political „regime“, or in other words, protest voters (Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2003:9).  
3. Empirical analysis of electoral performance of 
Eurosceptical parties 
3.1 Methodology and measuring anti-Europeanism 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the importance of Euroscepticism, this thesis 
will also include the aspect of saliency of the EU and European Integration in it 
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(common denominator „European Issues“ in this thesis). To best do this, this research 
will use The Manifesto Project Dataset that is a part of the MARPOR or Manifesto 
Research on Political Representation project, which is a content-analysis based dataset 
that  „provides the scientific community with parties’ policy positions derived from 
content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos. The MARPOR project aims to 
substantively analyse the role of parties at different stages of the political process and it 
specifically examines the quality of programmatic representation. It studies the 
programmatic supply of parties, the relation between parties and voters, the role of 
parties in parliament, and the translation of party programmes into policy output,“ 
(MARPOR). 
The main reason behind the authors’ usage of Project Manifesto Dataset and not 
an alternative like for an example Chapel Hill Dataset is that the data from Project 
Manifesto dataset is the most available, in .xls format, which does not require additional 
paid licences for programs, such as STATA. Secondly, in a similar research conducted 
by Heinisch, Landsberger and Schlipphak, which conceptualized the saliency of 
different matters in party manifestos, raised the issue of Project Manifesto Dataset not 
having the data for more recent elections (Heinisch, Landsberger and Schlipphak 
2011:13). In this case, in the authors opinion, this is irrelevant, as the time-frame of the 
research is limited to the time of financial crisis plus one election and therefore, latest 
election data in the time window of 2010-2013 is sufficient. The second critique from 
Heinisch and Landsberger towards Project Manifesto Dataset is that the Project 
Manifesto Dataset measures the positions of parties presented by parties in advance to 
the European Parliament elections, which might overestimate salience parties ascribe to 
European or Eurosceptic matters, but this is irrelevant in the case of this thesis since it 
focuses on national elections and not European Parliament elections (Heinisch, 
Landsberger and Schlipphak 2011: 10-11) 
In the Project Manifesto Dataset, the number of pro and con arguments to certain 
subject matters for each given party manifesto are listed. First of all, with this 
information it can be seen, if the party is pro- or anti-European in its rhetoric simply by 
adding the values. Pro- and anti-European statements are separately coded in the Project 
Manifesto Dataset, which makes it possible to just add the values. Anti-European 
statements will then be recoded to have negative values in order to add them together. 
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Pro-European values mean that there are N-number of positive values in the manifesto, 
for an example 7 pro-European lines in the manifesto would translate into a score of 7, 
exactly the opposite with the anti-European lines, 7 of these would translate into -7 and 
if added together, the outcome would be 0. By adding the two values, we get the sum, 
which define the overall attitudes of the party towards the EU and European Integration 
(which is labelled with „European Issues score“ in this thesis), if the sum of the two 
added values is positive, the party is considered pro-European, if the sum is negative, 
the party is considered to vocalize anti-European rhetoric.  
For the saliency aspect, the author will add together the overall arguments (pro 
and contra) in regard to the EU and European Integration and calculate the percentage 
that the „European Issues“ make up of the whole manifesto, meaning that if the 
percentage is 25, then a quarter of a given partys’ manifesto contains pro and/ or anti-
European statements. 
Since partys’ attitudes towards the EU and European Integration are bound to 
somewhat change in at least the number of times that these issues are reflected in their 
respective election manifestos, then the „European Issues score“ will be calculated for 
each election separately, in order to see, if the rhetoric changes over time. At the same 
time, the author will present the election results that the party achieved with the given 
manifesto and how many places in the parliament that secured them, for each election 
that the party participated in the time-frame. The vote share percentage and places 
secured in parliament are also a part of the Project Manifesto Dataset, which is another 
reason to use it.  
In the analysis, the author will compare the longitudinal election results for each 
Eurosceptic party to draw conclusions if Euroscepticism has gained foothold after the 
financial crisis or not, meaning the thesis focuses on the time period of, because of data 
availability, 2007-2013. This is to compare if the times of decline in economy and 
worsening of everyday life standards for citizens has had an effect on, first of all the 
rhetorics of parties, and secondly, the election results. The author will also see, on 
which side of the left-right spectrum the parties tend to find themselves at according to 
Manifesto Project Dataset and if Euroscepticism is more likely to be found in old or 
new member states of the European Union. The analysis will be conducted for all of the 
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members of the European Union with the exceptions of Latvia, Malta, Greece and 
Cyprus, the reason behind it being that there was not enough election data in the given 
time frame for these countries. The results for the countries will be presented in no 
particular order. 
For categorization purposes, the elections held before the financial crisis reached 
Europe and the elections held in 2009, will be in one category and the elections held 
from 2010 and onwards, will be in the other. This is to prove or disprove that anti-
European parties gained votes in the elections held after the financial crisis as to 
compared before the crisis. During the whole time period ranging from 2005 until 2013, 
416 party Manifestos were analysed. 
 
3.2 Electoral success of Eurosceptic parties 
 
This chapter reviews the empirical data on the success of the Eurosceptic parties before 
and during the financial crisis. The chapter will also review how the parties’ stance on 
European Union has changed in time, according to party manifestos for elections before 
the crisis and during the crisis. This chapter will also try to find a correlation between 
the parties’ position on the traditional right-left scale and their take on the European 
Union and European Community.  
Lastly, it will be examined in this chapter, if there is a correlation between the 
electorates’ stance on the Euro-currency and the success of the Eurosceptic parties’ 
election results. Latvia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus will be left out of the research, 
because there is data for only 1 or no election manifestos during the time period of 
2005-2013 for these countries at the time of writing and therefore no comparisons can 
be made. 
During the whole time period ranging from 2005 until 2013, 70 out of a total of 
416 party election manifestos were found to be anti-European. In Romania, Croatia, 
Lithuania and Estonia, no manifestos were Eurosceptic. The average score of the 
European Issues of the 70 manifestos was -15,26. The most anti-European party, 
according to the Project Manifesto Database, is the French National front, that presented 
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a manifesto with a score of -72 for the 2007 elections, they achieved 4,29% of the total 
votes and with that result they got no seats in the parliament.  
In 52 manifestos, out of the 416, the European Union nor the European 
Community was not mentioned at all, meaning this topic was not salient at the time for 
the party in question. Somewhat surprisingly, among the party manifestos of the „old 
member states“ of the European Union, there were more manifestos, in which the EU or 
European Community was not mentioned in any way, the tally being at 36 versus 16 in 
the countries that joined in 2004 and onwards.  
The saliency that parties show towards European Issues differs not only from 
party to party, but also for parties in time. Out of the 52 manifestos, that did not find the 
EU and/or European Community salient enough to include it, 27 were written prior to 
2010, 25 were written in 2010 or later. There were only 3 parties, that did not include 
the European Union or the European Community in any of their manifestos in the time 
period of 2005-2013, 2 of them being Danish (V Liberals and Social Democratic Party, 
both participated in 3 elections during the time), and 1 from the Czech Republic (The 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, participated in 2 elections during the time). 
All of the other parties left the EU/European Integration out only once. European Issues 
are held the least salient in Denmark, where the EU was left out of the manifests 10 
times out of 25. In Austria, Estonia, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Slovakia and 
Slovenia the European Issues were mentioned in every party manifesto included in the 
research.  
Overall the results for the countries, that were hit hardest by the financial crisis, 
are ambiguous. In out of the seven countries that were included in the research that had 
an unemployment rate of 10% and above in 2009 in three (Spain, Hungary and Ireland) 
the vote share for anti-European parties rose by the next election, in two of them it 
declined (Portugal and Slovakia) and in two countries- Estonia and Lithuania- there 
were no parties that had presented an anti-European manifesto (Eurostat). When 
viewing the results for the ten countries that suffered the most severe decline in GDP in 
2009, there are four countries (Hungary, Finland, Ireland and Germany) where anti-
European manifestos have won votes at the next elections; only in Slovenia has the vote 
share gone down. In four countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia), there 
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were no anti-European manifestos during any elections and there was no data on Latvia 
(Eurostat).  
 When viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, in out of the 15 
countries, where purchasing power had gone down in 2009, in 8 anti-European parties 
won more votes at the next elections, in three countries the vote share went down. In 
four countries, no parties had presented an anti-European manifesto and there was no 
data on the parties’ manifestos from Latvia.  
 
Sweden 
For Sweden, there was data available for two elections- 2006 and 2010. The only party 
to present an anti-European manifesto for both elections was MP Green Ecology Party 
that is on the left side of the linear left-right spectrum. It had an European Issue score of 
-2 for both elections, in 2006 1% of the manifesto was dedicated to European Issues, in 
2010 the percentage was at 0,8. In 2006 they achieved 5,2% of the total votes, which 
got them 19 of the total 349 seats. In 2010, 7,3% of the electorate voted for them and it 
resulted in 25 seats of 349. In Sweden, the V Left Party presented an anti-European 
manifesto for the 2006 elections, which had a score of -9 and it resulted in 5,9% of the 
votes and 19 seats, however in the next elections they presented a manifesto, which 
gave no importance to European issues at all and they got 5,6% of the votes and 19 
seats in the Parliament.  Interestingly, in comparison with the 2006 elections, in 2010 
there was a newcomer in the face of the SD Sweden Democrats Party, that is positioned 
on the right side of the left-right spectrum, which presented a manifesto with the score 
of -9 and in which the European Issues made up 4,4% of the content, that got them 
5,7% of total votes and 20 seats.  
 
Denmark 
For Denmark, there was data available on three elections: 2005, 2007 and 2011. In total 
there were 2 parties that presented signs of anti-Europeanism. The first one, EL Red-
Green Unity List, which is a moderate-left party, has in time gotten less anti-European 
with the corresponding scores: -22 in 2005, -10 in 2007 and -3 in 2011, the respective 
16 
 
 
percentages for European Issues represented in the manifestos were 10%, 3,3% and 
0,7%. The Party hasn’t fared too well in the elections, in 2005 it got 3,4% of the total 
votes which resulted in 6 seats in the Parliament, in 2007 it was 2,2% with 4 seats but 
2011 brought a slight improvement, with 6,7% of the total votes and 12 seats of the total 
175. The Danish People’s Party, which in opposite to Red-Green Unity List, finds itself 
on the right-side of the spectrum, participated also in all of the said 3 elections, the 
according EU-issue scores were: -3 in 2005, -4 in 2007 and -22 in 2011 and the 
respective percentages for European Issues in those manifests were 6,8 in 2005, 12,8 in 
2007 and 6,3 in 2011. Interestingly the election results have stayed roughly the same, 
with the party getting 13,2% of the votes in 2005, resulting in 24 of the 175 total seats, 
in 2007 they fared slightly better, getting 13,8% of the votes and 25 seats and in 2011 it 
was 12,3% of the votes and 22 seats, meaning a slight decline.  
 
Finland  
For Finland, there was data on 2 elections, in 2007 and in 2011. Finland has only 1 
party, that can be considered anti-European, the True Finns, which is a nationalist, right-
wing party. In the 2007 elections, the True Finns got 4% of the total electorate votes, 
which resulted in 5 of the total 200 seats in the parliament. Astonishingly, the True 
Finns devoted about 11% of their total manifesto at the time to European Issues, which 
had a score of -64. In 2011, the True Finns managed a „surprise victory“, as they got the 
third best result in the countries’ election, 19% of the votes and 39 seats in parliament. 
They did however tone their manifesto down a little bit- the score for it was -58 and this 
time it occupied „only“ 3,9 of their total manifesto.  
 
Belgium 
For Belgium, there is data on 2 elections- 2007 and 2011.The Flemish Interest, a right-
wing party can be considered mildly Eurosceptic, since in the 2007 elections, it had a 
EU-issue score of -8 with 2,2% of the manifesto dedicated to European Issues, but that 
changed to a +2 for the 2010 elections, with 1,8% of the manifesto occupied by 
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European Issues. The Party did however receive 12% of the total votes in 2007 along 
with 17 seats but that declined to 7,7% in 2010 with 12 seats.  
 
Netherlands 
For the Netherlands, there was data on 2 elections- 2006 and 2010. There were 2 parties, 
that can be considered anti-European, however the Socialist Party went from a -28 score 
in 2006 to a neutral 0 stance in 2010. With the more anti-European manifesto in 2006, 
they received 16,6% of the total votes, which resulted in 25 seats of the 150 in the 
parliament, but in 2010 they declined to 9,8% share of the votes and 15 seats. European 
Issues were regarded in the manifestos with 2,5% and 1,7% of total lines.  The second, 
Party of Freedom, which lies on the right side of the linear ideological spectrum, started 
out less anti-European, with a -8 score in 2006 but went to -36 in 2010, with the 
European Issues reflected in the manifestos 5,8% and 5,3% of the total lines 
respectively. In 2006, the Freedom Party received 5,9% of the total votes, which 
resulted in 9 seats. In 2010, they fared better and got 15,5% of the votes and 24 seats. 
 
Luxembourg 
For Luxembourg, there was data on 2 elections- 2009 and 2013. In Luxembourg, there 
is one party that can be considered anti-European in 2009 and more so in 2013- the 
centristic Alternative Democratic Reform Party. In 2009, it presented a manifesto with 
the score of -2 and in 2010 they had moved it up to a -44 and the saliency of the 
European Issues had grown within the manifesto as well, from less than 0,1% in 2009 to 
2,3% of the total manifesto lines in 2013. In the elections, the party received 8,1% of 
the total votes, resulting in 4 seats of the 60 total in parliament. In the 2013 they fared 
slightly worse, with 6,6% of the votes they got 3 seats in the parliament. 
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France 
For France, there was data on 2 elections, 2007 and 2012. One party, the National Front 
which, as its name says, is a nationalistic right-wing party, can be considered anti-
European. For the 2007 elections the National Front presented a manifesto which had a 
score of -72, by 2012 they however toned the anti-EU rhetoric down quite a bit, 
resulting in a score of -15. The saliency percentage lies for 2007 at 5,9% of the total 
lines in the manifesto and 5,1% in 2012. The National Front did not fare very well in the 
2007 elections in which they got 4,3% of the votes and no places in the 577 seats strong 
parliament. They did somewhat better in 2012 however, when they got 13,6% of the 
total votes and 2 seats in the parliament. 
 
Italy 
For Italy, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2008 and 2013 but curiously, there 
are no parties that had shown signs of Anti-Europeanism before 2013, in the 2013 
elections there were four: Civil Revolution, Left Ecology Freedom, Labour and 
Freedom List and Brothers of Italy- National Center-Right, the first two are left-wing, 
Labour and Freedom List being left-center and Brothers of Italy-National Center-Right 
as its name says, is center-right. Their combined significance, although, is very little, 
with the left and center-left parties gaining a combined vote share of 5,7% and 38 seats 
of the 630 in parliament. The European Issues percentage in their respective manifestos 
ranged from 0,5% to 1,6%. Brothers of Italy- National Center-Right gained 1,9% of the 
total votes and won 9 seats in the parliament, however, it only assigned 0,2% of its 
manifesto for European Issues, with a score of -7. 
 
Spain 
For Spain, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2011. In Spain, there are two 
parties that showed anti-Europeanism in their respective manifestos. The United Left 
party showed a score of -6 for European Issues in 2008 and -13 in 2011, the overall 
significance of the European Issues was rather low, though, with about 1% of the 
manifesto in 2008 dedicated for European Issues and less than 0,1% in 2011. The party 
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achieved 3,8% of the vote share in 2008, gaining 2 of the total 350 seats in parliament. 
In 2011 they achieved better results with 7% of the votes and 11 seats in parliament. 
The second and smaller party is the Galician Nationalist Bloc, which scored -21 in 2008 
and -17 in 2011 on the European Issues, with the percentages of European Issues 
mentioned in the manifestos being 0,4 and less than 0,1 respectively. The party 
achieved 2 seats in both parliament elections, with 0,8% vote share in both elections.  
 
Portugal 
For Portugal, there was data on two elections, 2009 and 2011. There were 2 parties, that 
can be considered slightly anti-European and both lie on the left side of the ideological 
spectrum: Left Bloc and Portuguese Communist Party. The Left Bloc scored a -29 on 
the European Issues in 2009 and -21 in 2011 and they dedicated 2,9% of their manifesto 
to European Issues in 2009 and 3,4% in 2011. The Left Bloc achieved 10,1% of the 
votes and 16 seats out of 230 in 2009. In 2011 they did not fare quite as good, with the 
vote share achieved being at 5,4% which got them 8 seats in parliament. The Portuguese 
Communist Party scored -29 in 2009 and -16 in 2011 on the European Issues, with 2,5% 
of the whole manifesto being dedicated to European Issues in 2009 and 3,4% in 2011. 
Their election results were fairly stable, in 2009 they achieved 7% of the votes and 13 
seats and in 2011 it was 7,2% and 14 seats in the parliament.  
 
Germany 
For Germany, there was data for three elections- 2005, 2009 and 2013 but anti-
Europeanism was only found amongst the parties that ran for office in 2013- The Pirate 
Party, which is considered to  be on the left side of the ideological spectrum according 
to its manifesto through the Manifesto Project Database
1
. The Pirate Party scored -8 on 
the European Issues and 1,1% of its election manifest was dedicated to the European 
Issues. In total they achieved 2,2% of the total votes but that did not earn them any seats 
                                                          
 
1
 Siia manifesto website link. 
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in the parliament. The Alternative for Germany is a far-right-populist party, it scored -9 
on the European Issues and it devoted 15% of its manifest to the matter. The Alternative 
for Germany got 4,7% of the total votes in 2013 but failed to secure a seat in the 
parliament with this result.  
 
Great Britain 
For Great Britain, there was data for 2 elections- 2005 and 2010. Sadly, the Manifesto 
Project Database has not coded United Kingdom Independence Party, which got 2,2% 
of the votes in 2005
2
 and 3,1% in 2010, but failed to secure representation in the 
parliament with the result
3
. However there is data on the Conservative Party, which 
scored -6 on European Issues in 2005 and -5 in 2010 with the percentage of the 
manifesto dedicated for European Issues in 2005 being at 4,1 and 2,3 in 2010. The 
Conservative Party got a total 32,4% of the total votes which resulted in 198 seats in the 
parliament in 2005 and 36,1% of the votes in 2010, which in turn resulted in 307 of the 
649 total seats.  
 
Ireland 
For Ireland there was data on 2 elections- 2007 and 2011. One party in Ireland can be 
considered anti-European, Ourselves Alone or Sinn Fein. In 2007 it scored -20 on the 
European Issues with the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to European Issues at 
1,5. The party achieved 6,9% of the votes and 4 of the total 166 seats in the parliament. 
In 2011 the party scored -1 on the European Issues, with less than 0,2% of the manifest 
dedicated to European Issues. The party won 9,9% of the vote share in 2011  and 
secured 14 seats in parliament.  
 
                                                          
 
2
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-
elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf 
3
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/excel_doc/0020/105725/GE2010-
constituency-results-website.xls 
21 
 
 
Bulgaria 
For Bulgaria, there was data on three elections- 2005, 2009 and 2013. One Party, the 
National Union „Attack“ can be considered to be anti-European, as it scored negatively 
on European Issues on two occasions- for the 2005 elections, they presented a manifesto 
which scored -2 and for the 2013 elections one that scored -24. For the 2009 elections, 
they presented a manifesto, which gave no prominence to European Issues at all. In the 
election manifesto presented for the 2005 elections, 5,2% of the whole was dedicated to 
European Issues and in 2013, 1,4%. The party has been fairly stable at the elections, 
with 8,1% of the votes going their way in 2005, resulting in 21 seats of the 240 in total. 
In 2009, they again got 21 seats with 9,4% of the votes and in 2013 they scored 7,3% of 
the votes, which secured them 23 seats in the parliament.  
 
Croatia 
For Croatia, there was data for two elections- 2007 and 2011 but no parties can be 
classified as anti-European because of their manifestos. Interestingly, no negative lines 
about the European Issues have been written in any of the manifestos presented by any 
party for the two election periods, little importance has been given to European Issues 
overall as well, with the highest percentage of lines being 6,7 by the Independent 
Democratic Serbian Party presented for the 2011 elections.  
 
Czech Republic 
For the Czech Republic, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2010 and 2013. The 
Civic Democratic Party of the Czech Republic, which is a center-right party, can be 
considered to be anti-European, although for the  2006 and 2010 elections they 
presented manifestos, that were overall positive of the European Issues- scoring 6 and 
11 respectively. For the 2013 elections the manifesto presented scored -6, however. The 
election results for the Civic Democratic Party have been on a steady decline. In 2006 
they achieved 35,4% of the votes, securing them 81 seats of the 200 in the parliament, 
thereby winning the elections. In 2010, they got 20,2% of the votes, which got them 53 
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seats in the parliament, being the second best result. In comparison, with the more anti-
European manifesto in 2013, they got 7,7% of the votes and 16 seats in the parliament. 
Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy, a right-wing populist party, participated 
in only the 2013 elections and for this election they presented a manifesto, which scored 
-6 on the European Issues, with 1,7% of the manifesto being dedicated to European 
Issues. They got 6,9% of the electorates votes, which resulted in 14 seats in the 
parliament. 
 
Hungary 
For Hungary, there was data on two elections- 2006 and 2010. In 2006, no parties which 
achieved representation in the parliament, presented anti-European manifests.  For the 
2010 elections, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary presented a manifesto, 
which scored -39 on the European Issues, with 3% of the manifesto being dedicated to 
European Issues. With this manifesto, the far-right party scored 16,7% of the votes, 
securing them the third-largest representation in the parliament with 47 out of the 386 
seats.  
 
Lithuania 
For Lithuania, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2012. However, no parties in 
Lithuania have presented a manifesto, which could be considered anti-European during 
the two election periods. Little importance has been given to the European Issues during 
the two election periods by the parties in Lithuania, with one exception being the 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in 2008, which dedicated 9% of its manifesto to the 
positive sides of European Issues with which they achieved 11,7% of the votes, 
resulting in 25 of the 141 seats in the parliament.  
 
Estonia 
For Estonia, there was data on two elections- 2007 and 2011, however no parties with 
an anti-European manifesto achieved representation in the parliament. Three parties in 
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Estonia presented a manifesto for the 2007 election periods, in which more than 4,5% of 
the whole was dedicated to European Issues, those three parties secured a total of 56 
seats of the 101 in parliament. 
 
Poland 
For Poland, there was data on three elections- 2005, 2007, 2011. In Poland, there are 
two parties that can be considered to be anti-European, the PiS Law and Justice party, 
which is a right-wing, national conservative party and the League of Polish Families, 
that is also a right-wing, national conservative party. In the manifesto presented for the 
2005 elections, they gave little importance to the European Issues, with them being 
mentioned only three times, which made up 0,9% of the whole manifesto that scored 1 
in the test. In the election, they got 27% of the electorates’ votes, which resulted in 155 
of 460 seats in the parliament. The party has grown more anti-European over time, 
though. For the 2007 elections, they presented a manifesto which scored -4 on European 
Issues, with the percentage of the European Issues represented in the manifest being at 
1,84. In those elections, the party won 32,1% of the votes, resulting in 166 seats in the 
parliament. During the 2011 election period, the party grew even more anti-European, 
with their manifesto scoring -34 and the European Issues 1% of their manifesto. The 
party achieved 30% of the votes and 157 seats in the parliament.  
In the 2005 elections, The League of Polish Families participated with their manifesto, 
in which European Issues made up 2,4% of the whole and which scored -4, which got 
them 8% of the total votes and secured 34 seats in the parliament. The party failed to 
achieve representation in the 2007 and 2011 elections and it seems plausible, that PiS 
Law and Justice gained votes because of that.  
 
Romania 
For Romania, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2012, however no parties have 
presented a manifesto, where the European Issues have been mentioned negatively. 
Overall, no party in Romania, has dedicated more than 2,3% of their manifesto to the 
European Issues.  
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Slovakia 
For Slovakia, there was data on three elections- 2006, 2010 and 2012. There are two 
parties which can be considered anti-European in Slovakia- Slovak National Party & 
Freedom and Solidarity, which are both right-wing parties. Only Slovak National Party 
participated in the 2006 elections, for which they presented a manifesto, that scored 11 
on European Issues and which had dedicated 1,9% of the whole to it. As far as the 
election results go, the Slovak National Party got 11,7% of the votes, which resulted in 
20 of the 150 seats in parliament. For the 2010 elections, the Slovak National Party 
presented a manifesto, which scored 7 on European issues and in which 3,8% of the 
whole, was dedicated to those. The party only achieved 5% of the votes, though, which 
got them 9 seats in the parliament. For the 2012 elections, the Slovak National Party 
presented a more critical approach to European Issues in their manifesto, which scored -
18 and in which 12,1% of the whole was dedicated to the European Issues.  The election 
results did not get any better because of that, though, and the party achieved 4,6% of the 
electorates votes and failed to uphold representation in the parliament. The Freedom and 
Solidarity, which was founded in 2009, presented a manifesto for the 2010 elections, 
that scored -17 and had dedicated 1,7% of the whole to European Issues. With it, they 
achieved a 12,1% of the votes in their first elections and secured 22 seats. For the 2012 
elections, they presented an even more anti-European manifesto, which scored -36 and 
in which 3,7% of the whole was dedicated to the European Issues. They did not win any 
votes with that, with the 5,9% of the electorate voting their way, which gave them 11 
seats in the parliament.  
 
Slovenia 
For Slovenia, there was data on two elections- 2008 and 2011. Only the Slovenian 
National Party has made any anti-European claims in their manifestos during the two 
election periods. For the 2008 elections, they presented a manifesto, which scored -2 in 
the test on European Issues and in which 1,5% was dedicated to those, with that they 
secured 5,4% of the votes and 5 seats of the 90 in the parliament. In 2011, the Slovenian 
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National Party failed to uphold representation in the parliament, with 1,8% of the votes 
going their way. For the election, they had presented a manifesto, which scored -4 and 
had dedicated 0,8% of their manifesto to European Issues. 
Overall the results for the countries that were hit hardest by the financial crisis 
are ambiguous. In out of the seven countries that were included in the research that had 
an unemployment rate of 10% and above in 2009 in three (Spain, Hungary and Ireland) 
the vote share for anti-European parties rose by the next election, in two of them it 
declined (Portugal and Slovakia) and in two countries- Estonia and Lithuania- there 
were no parties that had presented an anti-European manifesto (Eurostat). When 
viewing the results for the ten countries that suffered the most severe decline in GDP in 
2009, there are four countries (Hungary, Finland, Ireland and Germany) where anti-
European manifestos have won votes at the next elections, only in Slovenia has the vote 
share gone down. In four countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia), there 
were no anti-European manifestos during any elections and there was no data on Latvia 
(Eurostat).  
 When viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, in out of the 15 
countries, where purchasing power had gone down in 2009, in 8 anti-European parties 
won more votes at the next elections, in three countries the vote share went down. In 
four countries, no parties had presented an anti-European manifesto and there was no 
data on the parties’ manifestos from Latvia. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the results are ambiguous.  There is about an even number of cases where 
an anti-European rhetoric has won votes after the financial crisis and vice versa. When 
viewing the countries, that were hit the hardest by the financial crisis in the sense that 
they had to be bailed out, in Spain and Ireland anti-Europeanism has won more votes at 
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the next elections, in Portugal the votes declined. There was no manifesto data available 
for Cyprus and Greece, however.  
 When viewing countries with the highest unemployment rates in 2009, in three 
of them anti-European parties fared better at the next elections, two did worse. When 
turning attention to the ten EU-countries with the most severe decline in GDP in 2009, 
in four countries anti-Europeanism won votes at the next elections and in only one the 
vote share went down. In the other countries, there were no anti-European parties or 
data was missing. Also, when viewing GDP per capita in purchasing power, in 8 out of 
15 countries, where purchasing power went down, anti-Europeanism won votes and in 3 
the votes declined. In four countries there were either no anti-European parties or data 
was missing.  
All in all, there were 18 cases, where the election result of a party advocating 
anti-European rhetoric has improved during or after the financial crisis in Europe, but 
there were also 11 cases, in which the election result of such a party has declined, this is 
not enough to draw any definite conclusions, but it should sound some alarm bells in 
our heads, that should there be another supra-national crisis which affects the European 
Union and European Integration, the results might climb to be more worrisome, this 
also proves that anti-Europeanism is not insignificant, since in many countries, the rise 
was not something that one could look away from, such as the cases in Hungary, where 
Jobbik rose from a marginal party to one of the biggest seat holders in parliament. 
Secondly, the case of Finland, which expresses nicely, how tired the citizens of Finland 
have grown of a supra-national institution taking away the decision-making power and 
quite frankly, commanding the funds of Finland in an indirect way. Perhaps not as 
marginal as Jobbik was before the financial crisis, the True Finns have gained just as 
much influence in Finland. Perhaps not as extreme of a party, but still anti-European 
still, are the Conservatives in the UK, which has also seen a rise in support from 32,4% 
of the votes to 36,1%, which does not perhaps make huge and worrisome headlines all 
over the world, but still gives a sign, that anti-Europeanism might be getting more 
popular. In todays’ society, where information is easy to find and spreads at great 
speeds, knock-off parties in other parties are bound to come to life, since the societies in 
Europe are similar enough for these ideas to gain foothold also in the countries that they 
have not yet thus far.  
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Out of the parties under study, 22 were found to be on the right side of the linear 
ideological spectrum, 11 of them were on the left. This, in the authors’ opinion, proves 
that anti-Europeanism is more likely to be found among the right-wing parties, even 
more so amongst the right-extremes. On the other hand, anti-Europeanism is not limited 
to those advocating a nationalist view, rather it is found at least on both far ends of the 
ideological spectrum and sometimes even in the middle. This points out, that this is not 
something extraordinary anymore, for a person or a party to have and express anti-
European views. Of course the goals that find themselves at both of the ends of the 
ideological spectrum are different, but nonetheless can an anti-European be right- or 
left-wing or even a centrist.  
In the new member states of the European Union (countries that joined the EU 
after 2004), anti-Europeanism had gotten better results at elections during or after the 
financial crisis than before it 5 times. In 4 cases, in new member states of the European 
Union, anti-Europeanist parties got worse results during or after the crisis, than they did 
beforehand. In the old member states, 14 times parties got better results during or after 
the financial crisis than before it and in 6 cases, parties got worse results during or after 
the crisis, than before it. The old member states were represented with 24 parties in the 
research and the new member states with 9. It is somewhat surprising that in Estonia 
and Lithuania, the countries that suffered some of the worst GDP declines, there were 
no anti-European lines in the election manifestos.  
In the old member states, out of the 24 parties, 13 were found to be on the right 
side of the ideological spectrum, 11 were found to be on the left. Out of the new 
member states, all of the 9 parties that advocated anti-Europeanism were found to be 
right-wing parties. This is fascinating and it might be due to a number of reasons, for an 
example, it could be that in the old member states, parties feel the need to differentiate 
themselves from other parties and therefore express anti-Europeanism while in the new 
member states, this might not be the case since firstly, there are less parties. Secondly, 
the leftist parties (and the electorate for that matter) that have experience with the EU 
for a longer period of time, might be disappointed in the way it functions and seek 
reform and therefore advocate anti-Europeanism more strongly. This needs more 
research to give a definite answer to.  
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Most of the time, the results from the elections during or after the crisis did not 
differentiate from the ones held before the crisis hit too much, but there were some 
cases, where the anti-Europeanists have risen more strongly, for an example in Finland, 
where the True Finns effectively rose from a minor party to a substantial force in the 
domestic political landscape and expressed rather curious and extreme views in the 
media after the win. Also, the Conservatives win in the United Kingdom is not 
insignificant, they managed a growth of 3,7%, which in the United Kingdom resulted in 
109 more seats than previously, the popularity of this success story might pave way to 
newcomers, such as the UK Independence Party, which holds much more extremist and 
stronger anti-European views. Also in Germany, where anti-Europeanism was not 
widespread before the crisis, two parties have gained from it, albeit not securing 
representation in the parliament this time, chances are that they will grow their 
electorate even more with time.  
Of course it is not all one-sided, anti-European parties in Czech Republic, 
Portugal and Slovenia for an example, have lost the most support but these cases might 
be circumstantial and there might be a number of different reasons behind these cases of 
decline, this would need more research to make definite conclusions. 
All in all, the author is aware that the thesis still has room to improve, further 
research is required to tie party-based anti-Europeanist voting together with the public 
levels of Euroscepticism, this will be the next step in this series of the research and will 
be conducted in the future. Another dimension, that would be fascinating to study, is 
how the migration crisis has affected the national- and supra-national level of politics 
and while some research could be conducted already, the author feels that it still too 
early and we have not seen the last of the migration crisis, therefore this will be put off 
to the future when at least two more rounds of elections have been conducted to simply 
have a broader sample of both national and European elections to analyse.  
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6. Kokkuvõte: Analüüs finantskriisi mõjust Euroskeptiliste 
parteide valimistulemustele rahvuslikel Parlamendivalimistel   
 
Kokkuvõtlikult võib öelda, et tulemused on mitmetähenduslikud. Tulemustes on umbes 
võrdne arv juhtumeid, kus anti-Euroopalik retoorika võitis valimistel pärast finantskriisi 
rohkem hääli ning neid kus hääli kaotati. Kui vaadelda riike, mis said finantskriisi mõjul 
enim kannatada, eriti selles võtmes, et neile eraldati abipakett või mitu, siis Hispaanias 
ja Iirimaal võitsid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid järgmistel valimistel senisest 
enam hääli, Portugalis samas sellised parteid kaotasid hääli. Kreeka valimiste kohta ei 
olnud piisavalt andmeid.  
Vaadeldes riike, millel oli 2009. aastal kõrgeimad töötuse määrad, siis kolmes 
riigis võitsid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid järgmistel valimistel hääli, kahes 
neist kaotati hääli. Pöörates tähelepanu kümnele riigile, mis kaotasid enim 
sisemajanduse kogutoodangust, siis neljas riigis võitsid anti-Euroopalike manifestidega 
parteid hääli juurde ja ainult ühes langes häältesaak, teistes riikides polnud anti-
Euroopalikke ideid oma manifestidesse kaasanud riike või puudusid andmed. Samuti, 
kui vaadelda riike, kus sisemajanduse kogutoodang elaniku ostujõu standardi järgi 
langes, siis kaheksas riigis 15-st tõusis anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteide häältesaak, 
kolmes neist langes antud parteide häältesaak ning neljas sellises riigis ei olnud kas anti-
Euroopaliku manifestiga parteisid või puudusid andmed.  
Kokku oli 18 juhtumit, kui anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga partei võitis järgmistel 
valimistel hääli ning 11 juhtumit, mil hääli kaotati ning kuigi seda ei ole autori 
hinnangul piisavalt, et teha lõplike järeldusi, näitab see siiski mõningal määral üleüldist 
tendentsi. Järgmise riigiülese kriisi puhul, millesse puutub Euroopa Liit ja Euroopa 
Integratsioon, võivad tulemused tõenäoliselt muutuda senisest veel murettekitavamaks. 
Samuti näitab antud tendents seda, et anti-Euroopalik retoorika parteide esituses ei ole 
vähetähtis, kuna mitmes riigis ei saa häältevõitudest enam mööda vaadata nagu esiteks 
Ungaris Jobbiki puhul, mis tõusis marginaalse häältesaagiga parteist üheks suurima 
parlamandi-esindatusega erakonnaks. Teiseks Põlissoomlaste juhtum Soomes, mis 
näitab selgelt, kuidas soomlased tunnetavad, et rahvusülene institutsioon võtab 
rahvuslikult tasandilt ära otsustuspädevust ning de facto kontrollib finantsressursse. 
 Ehk mitte nii äärmuslik erakond, kuid siiski selgelt anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga, 
on Suurbritannia Konservatiivid, kelle tõetus on kasvanud kriisieelselt 32,4%-lt 36,1% 
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peale. Antud juhtum ei leidnud suurelt äramärkimist ajalehtede ja teiste 
meediaväljaannete esikülgedel murelike pealkirjade näol, kuid andis siiski selge 
signaali, et anti-Euroopalik retoorika on muutumas populaarsemaks ning tänapäeva 
ühiskonnas, kus informatsioon liigub kiiresti ja on lihtsasti leitav, on tõenäoline, et 
sarnaseid parteisid hakkab juurde tekkima, kuna Euroopa riikide ühiskonnad on 
piisavalt sarnased, et samasuguse retoorikaga ka teistes riikides toetust võita.  
 Kõikidest anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga erakondadest, mis uurimuse käigus 
vaatluse all olid, olid 22 lineaarselt parem-vasak ideoloogia skaalal paremal poolel, 11 
neist olid vasakul poolel. See tõestab autori arvates, et anti-Euroopalikku retoorikat võib 
suurema tõenäosusega leida parem-poolsete parteide hulgast ja veelgi enam 
paremäärmuslaste seast. Samas ei piirdu anti-Euroopalikkus ekstreemsete rahvuslastega, 
vaid seda võib leida parem-vasak skaala mõlemas ääres ning vahel ka keskel, muidugi 
on skaala mõlemas ääres erakondade eesmärgid üksteisest kardinaalselt erinevad, kuid 
siiski võib üks anti-Euroopalik isik või partei olla parem- või vasakpoolne või hoopiski 
tsentrist. See viitab asjaolule, et anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga samastumine ei ole enam 
midagi erakordset. 
 Euroopa Liidu uutes liikmesriikides (riikides mis liitusid aastal 2004 ja hiljem), 
saavutas anti-Euroopalik retoorika valimistel pärast majanduskriisi viiel korral paremaid 
tulemusi kui enne seda, neljal korral tulemused halvenesid.  Vanades Euroopa Liidu 
liikmesriikides saavutasid anti-Euroopaliku retoorikaga parteid valimistel pärast 
majanduskriisi 14 korral paremaid tulemusi kui enne ning kuuel korral tulemused 
halvenesid. Vanad Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigid olid uurimuses esindatud 24 erakonnaga 
ning uued liikmesriigid üheksaga. On mõnevõtta üllatav, et Eestis ja Leedus ehk riikides 
mis kaotasid finantskriisi ajal suurima osakaalu oma sisemajanduse koguproduktidest, 
ei leidunud partei-manifeste, mis oleksid väljendanud anti-Euroopalikkust.  
Vanades Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides paigutusid 24-st erakonnast 13 parem-
vasak ideoloogilisel skaalal paremale poolele, 11 vasakule. Uutes liikmesriikides oli pilt 
ebavõrdsem, kõik üheksa erakonda paigutusid skaala paremale poolele. Põhjus võib 
peituda näiteks selles, et vanades Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides tunnevad parteid 
suuremat survet teistest eristuda ja väljendavad seetõttu tugevamalt anti-Euroopalikke 
ideid, uutes liikmesriikides võib see vastupidine olla seetõttu, et parteide koguarv on 
väiksem. Teine põhjus võib peituda selles, et vanade liikmesriikide vasakpoolsetel 
parteidel ja ka valijaskonnal on pikem kogemus Euroopa Liiduga seoses ja seetõttu 
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ollakse rohkem pettunud EL’i funktsionaalsuses ja väljendatakse soove reformideks 
vastavalt hääletades, siiski vajab see rohkem uurimist, et ammendavat vastust anda.   
 Enamikel juhtudel ei erinenud kriisieelsed ja –järgsed valimistulemused 
üksteisest väga tugevalt, kuid leidus juhtumeid, kus anti-Euroopalik retoorika on 
tugevamalt tõusnud, näiteks Soomes, kus Põlissoomlased tõusid väike-partei staatusest 
suureks jõuks kodusel poliitmaastikul ning on pärast seda meedias üsnagi huvitavaid ja 
ekstreemseid vaateid väljendanud. Samuti ei ole Konservatiivide võit Suurbritannias 
vähetähtis, nemad suutsid tõetust kasvatada 3,7% ning said seetõttu 109 kohta 
parlamendis rohkem kui enne. Sellised edulood võivad sillutada teistele uutele ja veelgi 
ekstreemsematele tulijatele, näiteks Suurbritannias Iseseisvusparteile. Samuti ka 
Saksamaal, kus enne finantskriisi ei olnud anti-Euroopalik retoorika laialt levinud on 
kaks parteid sellest siiski võitnud ning hoolimata sellest, et kriisile järgnenud valimistel 
ei suudetud kindlustada kohti parlamendis, on tõenäoline, et oma valijaskonda 
kasvatatakse aja jooksul.  
 Siiski ei ole kõik päris ühepoolne. Anti-Euroopalikke vaateid väljendanud 
parteid Tšehhi Vabariigis, Portugalis ja Sloveenias näiteks on kaotanud suure osa oma 
toetajaskonnast, kuid antud languste taga võib olla erinevaid põhjuseid, mis vajaksid 
rohkem uurimist, et midagi kindlat järeldada.  
 Autor on teadlik, et antud uurimistööl on arenguruumi, põhjalikumalt tuleks 
uurida ning rohkem andmeid on vaja, et teha järeldusi anti-Euroopalikku retoorikat 
väljendavatele parteidele antud häälte ja avaliku Euroskeptitsismi seoste kohta, sellest 
saab antud uurimistöö järgmine samm ja teostatakse lähitulevikus. Teine aspekt, mille 
kohta puuduvad senini põhjalikud uurimused, rändekriisi ja rahvusliku ning rahvusülese 
poliitika seoste kohta, aga kuigi mõningane uurimistöö oleks juba praegu tehtav, oleks 
autori arvates otstarbekas oodata ära veel kahed valimised, et oleks rohkem andmeid 
valimistulemuste osas, mida analüüsida.  
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